A full-scale conventional invasion would most likely invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, and the consequences would be quite unpleasant and powerful. However, for Russia, which is already at war in Ukraine and internally struggling with a deteriorating economic situation, this may not be necessary. At the same time, a hybrid attack is something it could currently carry out, as the wording of Article 5 refers to a military attack where the aggressor is clearly identifiable. In contrast, situations where the aggressor is unclear and can be "sold" to the international community as internal unrest in the state would be a desirable scenario for Russia. It is worth recalling that Russia has already used elements of hybrid warfare in Ukraine even before the full-scale invasion. From a psychological perspective, it is known that people, including leaders, tend to repeat operations or tactical moves that have previously succeeded for them. Therefore, a hybrid operation could now precede something more serious, and its success or failure could influence the next phase – a conventional invasion and occupation of territory. "This does not mean that weapons would not be used in it," emphasizes M. Verdins. "They could even shoot a lot, but the signs would be such that it would be very difficult to prove who the aggressor is. In the most dangerous scenario for us, there would not even be the appearance of 'little green men,' but some 'anti-fascist hunters' and the like, on behalf of whom attacks on critical infrastructure could occur, essentially – terrorism." "But one thing is clear – we in Latvia must not repeat the mistakes made by Ukraine in 2014, which allowed the situation to develop according to Russia's scenario and conditions, as the Ukrainian government reacted slowly and not very convincingly. This means that if we were threatened by a similar situation, we would need to be proactive and address problems as soon as they emerge, not after they have already occurred. This requires both political will and motivation, as well as the ability of the relevant structures to cope with significant and very unpleasant situations when the attackers are backed by a large resource base from Russia. Our border is quite long and complex, which means they could receive support through various routes." M. Verdins believes that Moscow's goal is to "destabilize the political situation." "First, some anonymous underground groups would emerge, with access to all of Russia's resource base, making political demands. If no one responded to them, terrorist actions could follow, very likely using drones. However, these would not be long-range drones, but ones with a range of 10-12 kilometers, so they could not be linked to Russia. Then Russia could say: 'You have some internal problems there, dear friends, they are not ours.'