Foto: BB.LV / Паспорт РФ
Since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the legal Russian diaspora in the European Union has increased by 105,000 people. An analysis of official Eurostat data shows that by the end of 2025, the total number of Russians with valid residence permits and permanent residence in the EU grew by 13.6%, reaching 876.6 thousand compared to 771.8 thousand in 2021. ## ## Geography of Settlement The leaders in the total number of accepted Russians were Germany (218 thousand), Spain (116.8 thousand), and Estonia (78.4 thousand). The least number of Russians were registered in Romania, Croatia, and Malta (about 1.5–1.9 thousand). At the same time, the diaspora grew most actively in warm countries. In Spain, the number of relocants increased by 44.4 thousand, in France by 13.7 thousand, while in Cyprus and Portugal, the number of residents from the Russian Federation surged by 2.5 and 3.5 times, respectively. Against the backdrop of active emigration of Russians abroad, a reverse trend has also emerged: strict migration policies have led to an outflow of Russian citizens from the Baltic States and Central Europe. Their presence has decreased most significantly in Latvia, Estonia, and the Czech Republic. Observers also speak of a so-called second wave of migration beyond the EU. Major relocation hubs have become the CIS countries, Serbia, and Turkey. In Serbia, the number of Russians skyrocketed from pre-war 5 thousand to 61.9 thousand by the end of 2025. In Kazakhstan, more than 107 thousand people settled by spring 2026, while in Armenia and Georgia, the numbers were 43.5 and 70 thousand, respectively. The only country that experienced a sharp outflow after the initial surge was Turkey: by June 2026, the number of valid residence permits there fell to 75.9 thousand — half of the peak values of 2023. Mostly, the country was left by young childless couples, where the age of both partners did not exceed 36 years. These are predominantly well-educated individuals: either representatives of professions least protected from repression (human rights defenders, journalists, and political scientists), or the most sought-after and adaptable professionals — specialists in IT technologies, engineers, researchers, and educators. Among those who left, only 20% do not have higher education, while 9% of emigrants are university students (bachelor's, master's, and doctoral students), and another similar percentage plans to study at universities in their new place of residence. Since the beginning of the emigration wave in 2022, researchers have identified subgroups within the emigrant flow, conditionally dividing those who left into: settlers — those who believe they have settled in a new country for a long time; nomads — those who have already emigrated but are preparing to move to another country abroad; those sitting on suitcases — planning to leave Russia in the next six months. Survey data and the methodology for dividing relocants into groups are presented in the OutRush Research Report. Host countries have benefited differently from the massive influx of Russian citizens, and the depth of this effect primarily depended on the size of the local economy. The dynamics of this influence were wave-like: in the first years, economic activity sharply increased, and then transitioned to a smooth stabilization. In intermediate transit countries such as Armenia and Georgia, the economic effect was most pronounced from 2022 to 2024. Due to the urgent and massive influx of capital, as well as the opening of new businesses, GDP growth in these countries peaked at 9–9.4%. Serbia, which accepted a significant portion of relocants, also recorded a surge in economic indicators. Russians brought substantial financial resources with them: the average income of Russian households in Serbia was about 3,500 euros (compared to an average of 900 euros for the local population), while in Georgia it was 3,300 euros (with a local average of 650 euros). These funds directly flowed into domestic markets through rent, real estate purchases, and the service sector. However, by 2025–2026, this initial explosive impulse waned. The economies of host countries adapted to the new scales, and GDP growth rates stabilized and returned to more familiar figures in the range of 5–7% per year. An important long-term factor of benefit for budgets was the nature of the employment of those who left. Instead of fierce competition with locals for jobs, Russians massively registered their own enterprises or continued to work remotely for foreign markets. Up to 41% of relocants in the IT sector and about 21% in the media retained foreign sources of income, turning their taxes and everyday expenses into a net influx of currency for the host economies. For EU countries such as Germany, Spain, France, and Portugal, demographic and professional dividends have come to the forefront. In the context of an aging European population, the influx of specialists with an average age of 32 helped partially compensate for the labor shortage. EU countries received ready-made professionals in high-tech and creative sectors without any costs for their training. Moreover, in major settlement hubs such as Belgrade, Limassol, Tbilisi, and Yerevan, a steady demand has formed in the upper segment of services. This led to the opening of new coworking spaces, IT hubs, cultural spaces, and restaurants, which spurred the development of urban infrastructure. Researchers also note a high speed of assimilation: migrants of this wave practically do not create isolated enclaves, which minimizes the burden on the social institutions of host states and simplifies their integration. ## Is Home Better? At the same time, researchers are recording a process of reverse migration, the scale of which varies significantly depending on the counting methodology. According to the independent sociological project OutRush, no more than 8% of emigrants returned to Russia in the year from summer 2023 to summer 2024, while about 5% of respondents expressed such an intention in the near future. Monitoring by the Institute of Applied Economic Research of RANEPA estimates the total share of returnees among the relocants of the 2022–2023 wave at about 10%. At the same time, consulting companies and recruiting services report higher figures: according to their estimates, between 16% (among IT specialists) and 40–45% of the total number of those who left during the peak period could have returned to Russia. The main reasons for returning or changing countries, experts say, include difficulties in finding work abroad, everyday problems, challenges with legalization, and the closure of relocated offices. Meanwhile, official channels report a decline in interest in relocating to Russia itself: according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2025, the state program for the voluntary resettlement of compatriots reached a historical low — only 26,700 people arrived in the country.
